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Abstract
We study a generalization of the classical stable matching problem that allows for cardinal preferences
(as opposed to ordinal) and fractional matchings (as opposed to integral). In this cardinal setting, stable
fractional matchings can have much larger social welfare than stable integral ones. Our goal is to understand
the computational complexity of finding an optimal (i.e., welfare-maximizing) stable fractional matching. We
consider both exact and approximate stability notions, and provide simple approximation algorithms with
weak welfare guarantees. Our main result is that, somewhat surprisingly, achieving better approximations
is computationally hard. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first computational complexity results
for stable fractional matchings in the cardinal model. En route to these results, we provide a number of
structural observations that could be of independent interest.
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1. Introduction
The stable matching problem is one of the most extensively studied problems at the interface of economics
and computer science [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. The input to the problem consists of the preference lists of two sets
of agents, commonly referred to as the men and the women. The goal is to find a stable matching, i.e., a
matching in which no pair of man and woman prefer each other over their assigned partners.5
While the problem was originally motivated by college admissions [1], its applicability has subsequently
expanded to various other domains such as medical residency [6, 7] and school choice [8]. In addition, the
insights gained from the study of the stable matching problem, together with the development of computa-
tional tools and techniques in artificial intelligence, have shaped the design of modern two-sided matching
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platforms such as organ exchanges [9] and ridesharing platforms [10].10
The standard formulation of the stable matching problem involves two important assumptions, namely
that the matching is integral (i.e., two agents are either completely matched or completely unmatched)
and that the agents have ordinal preferences (typically in the form of rank-ordered lists). Although these
assumptions suffice in a number of applications, including those mentioned above, there are natural examples
where they could be inadequate. For instance, consider a time-sharing scenario [11] wherein a set of employees15
are matched with a set of supervisors. Assuming that each individual can spend one unit of time at work, an
integral matching prescribes that every employee should work full time with a single supervisor. On the other
hand, fractional matchings allow the employees to divide their time in working with multiple supervisors,
making them a more natural modeling choice in such situations. Fractional matchings are also useful in the
context of randomization, as they can be used to model lotteries over integral matchings [12, 13, 14].20
In a similar vein, ordinal preferences, despite their simplicity and ease of elicitation, can often be quite
restrictive. Indeed, in many real-world matching applications, the outcomes experienced by the partici-
pants are inherently cardinal in nature (e.g., wages in labor markets or quality of transplants in kidney
exchange [15]). In such settings, it is decidedly more natural to model the intensity of preferences, as has
been noted both in theory [16, 17] as well as in lab experiments [18].25
Motivated by these applications, we consider a generalization of the stable matching model that allows
for fractional matchings (as opposed to integral) and cardinal preferences (as opposed to ordinal). More
concretely, we consider a setting in which the preferences are specified in terms of numerical utilities or
valuations (for example, in the matching instance in Figure 1, m1 values w1 at 0, and w1 values m1 at
3). A fractional matching is simply a convex combination of integral matchings, and an agent’s utility30
under a fractional matching is the appropriately weighted sum of its utilities under the constituent integral
matchings. A fractional matching µ is stable if no pair of man and woman simultaneously derive greater
utility in being integrally matched to each other than they do under µ [19, 17]. Thus, for instance, in
the employee-supervisor example mentioned above, stability ensures that no employee-supervisor pair will
abandon their time-sharing arrangements and instead prefer to work with each other full time.35
The aforementioned generalization has clear merit in terms of social welfare: Stable solutions in the
generalized model can have larger welfare than those in the standard model, as the following example
illustrates.
Example 1. Consider the instance in Figure 1 with three men m1, m2, m3 and three women w1, w2, w3.
Among the six possible integral matchings, only two are stable, namely µ1 := {(m1, w3), (m2, w2), (m3, w1)}40
and µ2 := {(m1, w1), (m2, w3), (m3, w2)}; indeed, µ1 and µ2 are the men-proposing and women-proposing
Gale-Shapley matchings, respectively [1]. The social welfare (i.e., the sum of utilities of all agents) of these























Figure 1: An instance with cardinal preferences.
Define µ3 := {(m1, w1), (m2, w2), (m3, w3)}, and notice that W(µ3) = 8. Now consider a fractional
matching µ := 12µ2 +
1




2W(µ3) = 15/2 > 7 = W(µ1) =45
W(µ2), which means that µ has a higher social welfare than any stable integral matching. Importantly, µ
is a stable fractional matching. Indeed, in µ, the utilities of m1, m2, m3, w1, w2, and w3 are 0, 1/2, 3/2,
3, 3/2, and 1 respectively. Thus, for every man-woman pair, at least one of the two agents meets its utility
threshold for that pair, implying that µ is stable.
Overall, the instance in Figure 1 admits a stable fractional matching with strictly greater welfare than50
any stable integral matching.1
Starting with the seminal work of Gale and Shapley [1], an extensive literature has emerged over the years
on algorithms for computing stable solutions, including ones that optimize a variety of objectives pertaining
to fairness and economic efficiency [20, 21, 4, 22, 23]. Many of these algorithms, however, are tailored to
compute stable integral matchings. As Example 1 demonstrates, such algorithms could, in general, return55
highly suboptimal outcomes in our setting. Therefore, it becomes pertinent to understand the computational
complexity of finding an “optimal” stable matching in the generalized model. Our work studies this question
from the lens of the fundamental objective of social welfare, and asks the following natural question:
Can an (approximately) optimal stable fractional matching be efficiently computed?
1.1. Our results and roadmap60
We formalize the above question by defining the optimization problem Optimal Stable Fractional
Matching. To motivate this problem, we strengthen the observation in Example 1 to show that the social
1Observe that the gain in social welfare of µ was achieved by including an unstable integral matching µ3 in its support. One
could consider alternative notions such as ex-post stability [11] wherein the support consists only of stable integral matchings.
We discuss this and various other stability notions in Section 7, and find that insisting on a purely stable support results in
significant welfare loss (Remark 3). In fact, there exists instances where the support of an optimal stable fractional matchings
consists only of unstable integral matchings (Proposition 4).
3
welfare gap between the best stable fractional and the best stable integral matchings can be arbitrarily large.
We show that the favorable welfare properties of stable fractional matchings come at the cost of limiting
the algorithmic tools at our disposal. Specifically, we show that the set of stable fractional matchings65
can be non-convex (Proposition 3), and that, in the worst case, stable fractional matchings can have a
large support (Theorem 3), thus prohibiting the use of support enumeration algorithms. Nevertheless, we
present simple algorithms for Optimal Stable Fractional Matching with approximation ratio of 1 +
σmax/σmin, where σmax and σmin represent the maximum and minimum positive valuation in the input
instance, respectively (Theorem 5). For the variant Optimal ε-Stable Fractional Matching, where70
the stability constraints are relaxed by a multiplicative factor of (1− ε), an embarrassingly simple algorithm
computes 1/ε-approximate solutions (Theorem 6). We then proceed to our main results (Theorems 7 and 8),
which show that these approximation guarantees are—somewhat surprisingly—almost the best achievable via
polynomial-time algorithms (unless P = NP). To the best of our knowledge, these are the first computational
complexity results for stable fractional matchings in the cardinal preferences model.75
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present related work in the matching literature in
Section 1.2. We continue in Section 2 with preliminary definitions and warm up with exponential-time algo-
rithms that solve Optimal Stable Fractional Matching using linear programming. Section 3 presents
the structural properties of (nearly)-optimal solutions of Optimal Stable Fractional Matching. Our
algorithms are presented in Section 4, and our inapproximability results are presented in Section 5. Some80
proofs and additional material appear in the appendix.
1.2. Related work
The stable matching problem has been extensively studied for integral matchings. The universal existence
of a stable integral matching [1] has led to considerable research on stable solutions that, in addition,
optimize various measures of fairness or efficiency. A relevant example is that of optimizing the average85
rank of matched partners, which, in our model, corresponds to finding an optimal stable integral matching
when the cardinal utilities are completely specified by the ordinal ranks (e.g., if an agent is ranked at
position i, then it is valued at n + 1 − i). This problem is known to admit combinatorial polynomial-time
algorithms [21, 24]. Other examples of such problems include minimizing the difference between average
ranks of matched partners of men and women [25], optimizing the rank of matched partner for the least90
well-off agent [20, 26, 4], and maximizing (or minimizing) the cardinality of the matching [27, 23, 28].
A growing body of work in artificial intelligence and multiagent systems has studied variants of the stable
matching problem motivated by practical considerations such as minimizing the amount of information
exchange required in arriving at stable outcomes [29, 30] or ensuring strategyproofness in many-to-one
matchings with quota constraints [31, 32]. Various other papers have used computational approaches such95
as SAT solving [33, 34, 35] and constraint programming [36, 37, 38] in developing practically efficient solutions
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to computationally hard variants of the problem, as well as in axiomatic study of matching procedures [39].
Stability has also been studied in the context of fractional matchings. Starting with the works of Vande
Vate [40], Rothblum [41], and Roth et al. [11], there is now a well-developed literature on linear programming
formulations of the stable matching problem [22, 42, 43]. This line of work has led to novel stability notions100
such as strong stability [11], ex-post stability [11], and fractional stability [40], which are discussed further in
Section 7.2 A noteworthy difference with our work is that these notions have been studied with respect to
purely ordinal preferences.
Turning to cardinal preferences, we note that the notions of exact and approximate stability studied
by us (Definition 1) first appeared, to the best of our knowledge, in the work of Anshelevich et al. [19].105
They focus on qualitative, rather than computational, questions such as analyzing the “price of anarchy”
for integral stable matchings under various preference structures as well as its extensions to approximate
stability.3 Pini et al. [17] study the same notion with the goal of computing integral stable matchings that,
in addition, satisfy economic efficiency (in particular, Pareto optimality and its variants). They also study
strategic aspects which are an exciting avenue for future research even in our model.110
An interesting special case of our problem is when agents have symmetric preferences, i.e., for every
(m,w) ∈M ×W , U(m,w) = V (m,w). Deligkas et al. [47] study this model in the context of integral match-
ings, and show that computing a welfare-maximizing integral stable matching is NP-hard under symmetric
valuations. In general, stable fractional matchings can have much higher welfare compared to integral ones
(Example 1), and thus it is not clear a priori whether the result of Deligkas et al. for integral matchings115
has any implications for stable fractional matchings. Nevertheless, as we show in Lemma 1 in Section 2.2,
their result implies NP-hardness of Optimal Stable Fractional Matching. In comparison, our results
in Section 5 on the hardness of approximation are much stronger and also apply to approximate stability.
Finally, we note that stable fractional matchings under cardinal preferences have been previously studied
in economics literature [48, 49, 50, 51, 52]. Some of these works [49, 50] consider much more general matching120
models such as matching with transfers, blocking coalitions of arbitrary size, non-linear utilities, etc. The
focus in these papers is primarily on existential questions (such as the existence of competitive equilibria)
or on examining the logical relationship among various notions of stability and economic efficiency. Some of
these models are strict generalizations of ours, and therefore computational hardness results in our model
readily extend to these more general settings. Whether one can obtain stronger inapproximability results125
2The term “fractional stable matching” has been overloaded in the literature. For example, Teo and Sethuraman [22] use it
to refer to a feasible solution of stable matching linear program, and Aharoni and Fleiner [44] and Biró and Fleiner [45] use it
in the study of hypergraphic preference systems to refer to a slightly different solution concept. We refer the reader to [46] for
a detailed overview of these notions.
3The price of anarchy in this context is the worst-case multiplicative welfare gap between an optimal matching and an
integral stable matching.
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for these models is an interesting avenue for future research.
2. Preliminaries
An instance of Stable Matching problem with Cardinal preferences (SMC) is given by the tuple 〈M,W,U, V 〉,
where M := {m1, . . . ,mn} and W := {w1, . . . , wn} denote the set of n men and n women, respectively, and
U and V are n × n matrices of non-negative rational numbers that specify the valuations of the agents.130
Specifically, U(m,w) is the value derived by man m from his match with woman w, and V (m,w) is the value
derived by woman w from her match with man m. Many of our results will focus on two special classes of
valuations, namely binary (where U, V ∈ {0, 1}n×n) and ternary valuations (where U, V ∈ {0, 1, α}n×n for
some α > 1).
We will often describe an SMC instance using its graph representation. An instance I = 〈M,W,U, V 〉 can135
be represented as a bipartite graph with vertex sets M and W , and an edge for every pair (m,w) ∈M ×W
such that at least one of U(m,w) > 0 or V (m,w) > 0 holds. Each edge (m,w) in this graph has two
valuations associated with it, namely U(m,w) and V (m,w).
A fractional matching µ : M ×W → R≥0 is an assignment of non-negative weights to all man-woman
pairs such that
∑
w∈W µ(m,w) ≤ 1 for each m ∈ M and
∑
m∈M µ(m,w) ≤ 1 for each w ∈ W . A fractional140
matching µ is said to be complete if
∑
w∈W µ(m,w) = 1 for each man m ∈ M and
∑
m∈M µ(m,w) = 1 for
each woman w ∈ W . An integral matching µ is a fractional matching with weights µ(m,w) ∈ {0, 1} for
every pair (m,w). With slight abuse of notation, we sometimes view an integral matching µ as a set of
pairs and write (m,w) ∈ µ in place of µ(m,w) = 1. Also, unless stated otherwise, we will assume that any
fractional/integral matching is complete.145
It is well-known, and follows from the Birkhoff-von Neumann (BvN) theorem, that a (complete) fractional
matching µ can be written as a convex combination of k = O(n2) integral matchings µ(1), µ(2), . . . , µ(k) so
that for every pair (m,w) ∈M ×W , we have
µ(m,w) =
∑k
j=1 λj · µ(j)(m,w),
where λj > 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k} and
∑k
j=1 λj = 1. The set of integral matchings {µ(1), . . . , µ(k)} is called
the support of the fractional matching µ. Note that the support need not be unique.
We proceed with the formal definitions of stability and approximate stability, which, in turn, depend
on the utility derived by agents in a fractional matching. In particular, the utility derived by the man
m in µ is given by um(µ) :=
∑




Definition 1 (Stability [19, 17]). Given a fractional matching µ, a man-woman pair (m,w) is said to be a
blocking pair if um(µ) < U(m,w) and vw(µ) < V (m,w). A fractional matching µ is stable if there are no
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blocking pairs, i.e., for each (m,w) ∈M ×W , either um(µ) ≥ U(m,w) or vw(µ) ≥ V (m,w).
Thus, under a stable fractional matching, no pair of man and woman can simultaneously improve by155
breaking away from the fractional matching and instead being integrally matched with each other. This
notion of deviation is also reasonable from the viewpoint of bounded rationality, as agents only form blocking
coalitions of size two, and only deviate to an integral matching between the members of the coalition.
Definition 2 (ε-Stability [19]). Given any ε ∈ [0, 1) and a fractional matching µ, a man-woman pair (m,w)
is said to be ε-blocking if um(µ) < (1− ε)U(m,w) and vw(µ) < (1− ε)V (m,w); otherwise, the pair is said160
to be ε-stable. A fractional matching µ is ε-stable if all pairs are ε-stable.
Thus, a 0.01-stable fractional matching is one in which, for every man-woman pair, at least one of the
two agents already receives (at least) 99% of the utility that he or she would receive by being integrally
matched with the other. Note that a stable fractional matching is also ε-stable for every ε ≥ 0.
Notice that Definitions 1 and 2 entail that agents in a blocking pair prefer to switch to an integral165
match with each other. One could also consider an alternative formulation wherein the agents merely prefer
to increase their mutual fractional engagement, possibly at the expense of weakening other less preferred
matches. This is precisely the notion of strong stability (see Section 7 for the definition) which has been
studied in the context of ordinal preferences [11, 46]. However, as we note in Remark 3 in Section 7, a strongly
stable fractional matching can be strictly suboptimal in terms of social welfare, which further justifies the170
consideration of the stability notion in Definition 1.
The next statement follows from the seminal result of Gale and Shapley [1].
Proposition 1. Given any SMC instance I, a stable fractional matching µ for I always exists and can be
computed in polynomial time.
Proposition 1 was originally proven in [1] in the standard stable matching model with ordinal preferences175
and integral matchings. It is easy to see that given any SMC instance I, if an integral matching µ is stable
for an ordinal instance derived from I (where the ordinal preferences of each agent are consistent with its
valuations, breaking ties arbitrarily), then it is also stable for the original instance I.
Next, we define social welfare, which is a measure of the efficiency of a fractional matching.
Definition 3 (Social welfare). Given an SMC instance 〈M,W,U, V 〉 and a fractional matching µ, the social









w∈W (U(m,w) + V (m,w))µ(m,w).
An optimal matching is one with the highest social welfare among all fractional matchings. It follows180
from the BvN decomposition that an optimal matching is, without loss of generality, integral. Similarly, an
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optimal stable fractional matching (respectively, optimal ε-stable fractional matching) is one with the highest
social welfare among all stable (respectively, all ε-stable) fractional matchings. We will use Optimal Stable
Fractional Matching and Optimal ε-Stable Fractional Matching to refer to the corresponding
optimization problems.185
We will also discuss stable fractional matchings that are approximately optimal.
Definition 4 (ρ-efficiency). For ρ ∈ (0, 1], the term ρ-efficient will refer to a stable (respectively, ε-stable)
fractional matching with welfare at least ρ times the welfare of the optimal stable (respectively, ε-stable)
fractional matching. That is, µ is a ρ-efficient stable fractional matching if it is stable (respectively, ε-stable)
and W(µ) ≥ ρW(µ∗), where µ∗ is an optimal stable (respectively, ε-stable) fractional matching.190
Thus, an optimal stable (or ε-stable) fractional matching is 1-efficient.
2.1. Computing optimal stable fractional matchings
We will now discuss two exponential-time algorithms for Optimal Stable Fractional Matching.







subject to um ≥ U(m,w)y(m,w) ∀m ∈M,w ∈W (1)
vw ≥ V (m,w)(1− y(m,w)) ∀m ∈M,w ∈W (2)
um =
∑
w∈W U(m,w)µ(m,w) ∀m ∈M (3)
vw =
∑
m∈M V (m,w)µ(m,w) ∀w ∈W (4)∑
w∈W µ(m,w) ≤ 1 ∀m ∈M (5)∑
m∈M µ(m,w) ≤ 1 ∀w ∈W (6)
µ(m,w) ≥ 0 ∀m ∈M,w ∈W (7)
y(m,w) ∈ {0, 1} ∀m ∈M,w ∈W (8)
The non-negative weights µ(m,w) of man-woman pairs as well as the utilities um := um(µ) and vw :=
vw(µ) of the agents (set in equalities (3) and (4)) are the fractional variables of (OPT-Stab). The binary
variables y(m,w) encode the stability requirements for pair (m,w) in constraints (1) and (2). Indeed, by195
setting y(m,w) to 1 or 0, we can require either um(µ) ≥ U(m,w) or vw(µ) ≥ V (m,w). Constraints (5)
and (6) ensure feasibility. By enumerating over all possible combinations of values for the binary variables
y(m,w) for (m,w) ∈M ×W , we get 2n2 different linear programs, and at least one of them must have the
optimal stable fractional matching as its optimal solution.
8
Our second algorithm is slightly faster and solves at most O(nn) linear programs. It exploits the following
linear program (OPT-Thresh), which is defined using non-negative constants θm for m ∈ M and θw for







subject to um ≥ θm ∀m ∈M (9)
vw ≥ θw ∀w ∈W (10)
um =
∑
w∈W U(m,w)µ(m,w) ∀m ∈M (11)
vw =
∑
m∈M V (m,w)µ(m,w) ∀w ∈W (12)∑
w∈W µ(m,w) ≤ 1 ∀m ∈M (13)∑
m∈M µ(m,w) ≤ 1 ∀w ∈W (14)
µ(m,w) ≥ 0 ∀m ∈M,w ∈W (15)
When all utility thresholds are set to zero, the solution of (OPT-Thresh) is an optimal (i.e., welfare-200
maximizing) fractional matching. Using (OPT-Thresh) to maximize social welfare under stability constraints
is more challenging. We say that a set of utility thresholds is stability-preserving if for every pair of agents
m ∈ M and w ∈ W , either θm ≥ U(m,w) or θw ≥ V (m,w). Note that any fractional matching µ that is
feasible for (OPT-Stab) is also feasible for (OPT-Thresh) for some stability-preserving set of utility thresholds
(in particular, set the threshold of an agent equal to its utility under µ). Conversely, any fractional matching205
µ that is feasible for (OPT-Thresh) with some set of stability-preserving utility thresholds is also feasible for
(OPT-Stab).
One could now adopt the following strategy to solve Optimal Stable Fractional Matching: First,
enumerate all O(nn) tuples of utility thresholds (θm1 , . . . , θmn) with θm ∈ {U(m,w) : w ∈ W} for every
man m ∈ M . Next, for every choice of (θm1 , . . . , θmn), solve (OPT-Thresh) after appropriately setting210
(θw1 , . . . , θwn) where θw ∈ {V (m,w) : m ∈ M} for all w ∈ W , so that the set of utility thresholds is
stability-preserving. Among these solutions, the fractional matching with highest social welfare will be the
solution of Optimal Stable Fractional Matching. We note that (OPT-Thresh) resembles the integer
programming formulations with cut-off variables in other works [53, 54].
2.2. The case of symmetric valuations215
As mentioned previously in Section 1.2, a result by Deligkas et al. [47] implies NP-hardness of the problem
of computing an optimal stable integral matching on SMC instances. The construction of Deligkas et al.
involves a restricted class of SMC instances wherein the agents have symmetric (i.e., U = V ) and ternary
valuations in {0, 1, α} with α ∈ (1, 2).
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Proposition 2. Computing an optimal stable integral matching is NP-hard even for SMC instances with220
symmetric ternary valuations.
Our next result (Lemma 1) shows that for these SMC instances, the optimal stable fractional matching
is, without loss of generality, integral. Consequently, the result in [47] implies NP-hardness of Optimal
Stable Fractional Matching.
Lemma 1. Let I be an SMC instance with symmetric and ternary valuations, and let µ∗ be an optimal225
stable fractional matching for I. Then, there exists a stable integral matching µs such that W(µs) =W(µ∗).
Proof. Consider an optimal stable fractional matching µ∗ that is not integral (i.e., has support of size at
least two), and let µ be any integral matching in any support of µ∗. We will show that µ is a stable integral
matching. This would imply that all matchings in the support of µ∗ are optimal stable integral matchings,
as desired.230
Assume, for contradiction, that µ is not stable, and let (m,w) be a blocking pair in µ. Then, because of
symmetry, either U(m,w) = V (m,w) = 1 or U(m,w) = V (m,w) = α.
Suppose that U(m,w) = V (m,w) = 1. Then, either both m and w are unmatched in µ, or any pair
(m′, w′) in µ with either m′ = m or w′ = w satisfies U(m′, w′) = V (m′, w′) = 0. By replacing such pairs
with (m,w) in µ (and, subsequently, in the support of µ∗), we get a stable fractional matching with a higher235
welfare than µ∗, contradicting its optimality.
Now suppose that U(m,w) = V (m,w) = α. Then, either both m and w are unmatched in µ, or any pair
(m′, w′) in µ with either m′ = m or w′ = w satisfies U(m′, w′) = V (m′, w′) ∈ {0, 1}. However, since µ is
in the support of µ∗ (i.e., with strictly positive weight) and all valuations are less than or equal to α, the
utilities of both m and w in µ∗ will be strictly smaller than α, contradicting the stability of µ∗.240
From Lemma 1 and Proposition 2,we immediately have the following:
Corollary 1. Optimal Stable Fractional Matching is NP-hard.
3. Structural properties
In this section, we present several observations about the structure of optimal and nearly-optimal stable
fractional matchings. We begin by considerably strengthening our observation in Example 1 regarding the245
welfare gap between stable fractional and stable integral matchings.
Theorem 1. For every δ > 0 and α ≥ 2, there exists an SMC instance with ternary valuations in {0, 1, α}
and an optimal stable fractional matching µ∗ such that any stable integral matching µs satisfies W(µs) ≤(












































Figure 2: The SMC instance used in the proof of Theorem 1. As a convention, in graph representations where the two sides of
the bipartition do not appear as left and right, we use circles to represent men and diamonds to represent women.
Proof. Consider the SMC instance shown in Figure 2, which, for some k (to be determined later), consists250
of man mi and woman wi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, men e1i and e2i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, woman f1i for all
i ∈ {2, . . . , k − 1}, man e3i and women f2i and f3i for all i ∈ {2, . . . , k}.
To specify the valuations, we will use the following notation: For any a, b ≥ 0, we will say that a man-
woman pair (m,w) is an “a—b” edge if U(m,w) = a and V (m,w) = b. In the instance in Figure 2, the pairs
{(mi, wi)}ki=1, {(mi, f3i )}ki=2, and {(e1i , f1i )}
k−1
i=2 are 0—α edges, the pairs {(mi+1, wi)}
k−1
i=1 , {(e2i , wi)}
k−1
i=1 , and255
{(e3i , f2i )}ki=2 are α—0 edges, and the pairs {(e1i , wi)}
k−1
i=1 and {(mi, f2i )}ki=2 are 1—1 edges. All other pairs
are 0—0 edges. We remark that a slightly modified version of the instance in Figure 2 will be used again
later in the proof of Theorem 7 (refer to the accumulator gadget in Figure 7a).
Consider a stable integral matching µs. Since the pair (e11, w1) is a 1—1 edge, the stability requirement
dictates that either (m1, w1) or (e
1
1, w1) is contained in µ
s. Either of these pairs contribute at most α to the260
social welfare (recall that α ≥ 2). Additionally, since µs is an integral matching, we get that µs(m2, w1) = 0.
This, in turn, forces the pair (m2, f
2
2 ) to be contained in µ
s as well (or, otherwise, both m2 and f
2
2 will have
zero utility and violate stability). Continuing in this manner, we observe that the stability requirement for
the pairs {(mi, f2i )}ki=2 and {(e1i , wi)}
k−1
i=2 will force these pairs to be contained in µ as well. Each of these
pairs contributes 2 to the social welfare, and thus, W(µs) ≤ 4k − 6 + α.265
Now define a stable fractional matching µ as follows: Set µ(mi, wi) = 1/α for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k},
µ(e2i , wi) = 1− 2/α, µ(mi+1, wi) = 1/α, µ(e1i , wi) = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, µ(mi, f2i ) = 0, µ(mi, f3i ) =
1 − 2/α, µ(e3i , f2i ) = 1 for all i ∈ {2, . . . , k}, and µ(e1i , f1i ) = 1, for all i ∈ {2, . . . , k − 1}. (A similar
matching will be used later in the proof of Lemma 5.) It is easy to verify that the social welfare of µ is
W(µ) = 4k(α−1/2)−5α+3. Furthermore, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, both man mi and woman wi have utility270
1 in µ (i.e., umi(µ) = vwi(µ) = 1). Every 1—1 edge includes one of these agents, and these are the only edges








































Figure 3: The SMC instances used in the proofs of Propositions 3 and 4.
the stability constraint for those pairs is trivially satisfied). Therefore, µ is stable. The theorem follows by






gives the desired bound.275
We emphasize that Theorem 1 is a positive result as it establishes that stable fractional matchings
can have much higher welfare than their integral counterparts, and highlights the importance of Optimal
Stable Fractional Matching.
Our next observation (Proposition 3) shows that the set of stable fractional matchings can be non-convex
even for binary valuations. Interestingly, this does not prove to be a barrier in efficiently solving Optimal280
Stable Fractional Matching in this setting (see Theorem 4 in Section 4).
Proposition 3. There exists an SMC instance with binary valuations for which the set of stable fractional
matchings is non-convex.
Proof. Consider the instance I = 〈M,W,U, V 〉 with three men m1,m2,m3 and three women w1, w2, w3,
whose graph representation and agent valuations are shown in Figure 3a. Consider the integral matchings285
µ(1) := {(m1, w3), (m2, w1), (m3, w2)} and µ(2) := {(m1, w2), (m2, w3), (m3, w1)}. It is easy to verify that
both µ(1) and µ(2) are stable for I. However, the fractional matching µ := 0.5µ(1) +0.5µ(2) is not stable since
(m2, w2) is a blocking pair; indeed, 0.5 = um2(µ) < U(m2, w2) = 1 and 0.5 = vw2(µ) < V (m2, w2) = 1.
Remark 1. A follow-up work to the conference version of our paper has shown that non-convexity also holds
for strict preferences [55].290
Remark 2. It is worth comparing the non-convexity results in Proposition 3 and Remark 1 with similar
results for other stability notions. In particular, Aziz and Klaus [46, Theorem 1] have shown that the set of
strongly stable matchings (see Section 7 for the definition) can be non-convex. In Section 8, we revisit the
counterexample used in their proof, which is stated in terms of ordinal preferences, and show that there exists
a realization of cardinal preferences consistent with their instance such that the relevant convex combination295
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of (strongly) stable matchings is still stable. Thus, the non-convexity result of Aziz and Klaus [46] for strong
stability does not imply the same for the set of stable matchings.
The structure of stable fractional matchings becomes even more interesting (and, as we will see in
Section 5, also computationally unwieldy) when we move to ternary valuations. It turns out that the
support of a stable fractional matching can comprise entirely of unstable integral matchings (Proposition 4),300
and its size can grow linearly with the input (Theorem 3). These observations pose major limitations on the
set of algorithmic tools at our disposal.
Proposition 4. There exists an SMC instance with ternary valuations and a stable fractional matching µ
such that every integral matching in any support of µ is unstable.
Proof. Consider the SMC instance I = 〈M,W,U, V 〉 with three men and three women shown in Figure 3b.305
The parameter α ≥ 3 is a constant. There are six different perfect integral matchings:
• Matching µ(1), which consists of pairs (m1, w1), (m2, w2), and (m3, w3) and has a social welfare of 6. It
is easy to verify that this is the unique stable integral matching. Also, any subset of µ(1) is not stable
as the pair that is missing from µ(1) will be blocking.
• Matching µ(2), which consists of pairs (m1, w2), (m2, w3), and (m3, w1) and has a social welfare of 2α.310
The matching is not stable since the pair (m1, w1) is blocking.
• Matching µ(3), which consists of pairs (m1, w3), (m2, w1), and (m3, w2) and has a social welfare of 2α.
It is not stable since (m2, w2) is blocking.
• Matching µ(4), which consists of pairs (m1, w1), (m2, w3), and (m3, w2) and has a social welfare of
α+ 2. It is not stable since (m3, w3) is blocking.315
• Matching µ(5), which consists of pairs (m1, w3), (m2, w2), and (m3, w1) and has a social welfare of
2α+ 2. It is not stable since (m1, w1) is blocking.
• Matching µ(6), which consists of pairs (m1, w2), (m2, w1), and (m3, w3) and has a social welfare of
α+ 2. It is not stable since the pair (m2, w2) is blocking.
Consider the matching µ := 1α(α−1) · µ
(2) + 1α · µ
(3) + α−2α−1 · µ
(5). It is easy to verify that µ is stable.320
Indeed, the utilities of the agents in µ are given by um1(µ) = 0, um2(µ) = 1, um3(µ) = α − 1, vw1(µ) = 1,
vw2(µ) =
α−2
α−1 and vw3(µ) = α−
1
α−1 . Notice that only the pairs (m1, w1), (m2, w2), and (m3, w3) need to
be checked for stability. For each of these pairs, at least one of the agents has a utility of at least 1 in µ,
implying that µ is stable. Finally, notice that µ(m1, w1) = 0, which means that the unique stable integral
matching µ(1) cannot occur in any support of µ.325
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We remark that with some extra work, one can show that the matching µ in the proof of Proposition 4
is the unique optimal stable fractional matching.
One might wonder whether the support of an optimal stable fractional matching always consists of an
optimal integral matching. This turns out to not be the case, as illustrated by the following instance:
Consider two men m1,m2 and two women w1, w2 with valuations given by U = [ 2 01 0 ] and V = [
0 0
1 2 ]. The330
unique optimal integral matching is {(m1, w1), (m2, w2)} while the unique optimal stable fractional matching
is {(m1, w2), (m2, w1)}.
As mentioned previously in Section 2, a (stable) fractional matching is the convex combination of at most
n2 integral ones. Theorem 2 provides a stronger bound on the support size of an optimal stable fractional
matching.335
Theorem 2. Given any SMC instance I, there exists an optimal stable fractional matching for I with at
most 4n integral matchings in its support.
Proof. Let µ∗ be an optimal stable fractional matching for I. Recall from Section 2.1 that µ∗ solves the
program (OPT-Thresh) for some set of stability-preserving utility thresholds. Observe that (OPT-Thresh)
has n2 free variables (we ignore here the 2n variables um for m ∈ M and vw for w ∈ W , which depend340
on the remaining ones according to constraints (11) and (12)). Without loss of generality, µ∗ is an optimal
extreme point solution of (OPT-Thresh). That is, when (OPT-Thresh) is instantiated for µ∗, n2 linearly
independent inequality constraints become tight. Among them, at most 4n can correspond to the sets of
constraints (9), (10), (13), and (14). The remaining ones must correspond to the set of constraints (15),
implying that at least n2 − 4n free variables will be equal to zero. Thus, µ∗ can assign positive weights to345
at most 4n man-woman pairs and, consequently, can have at most 4n integral matchings in its support.
Next we show that the bound in Theorem 2 is tight up to a constant factor.
Theorem 3. For every ρ ∈ (0, 1], there exists a family of SMC instances with ternary valuations for which
any support of a ρ-efficient stable fractional matching consists of Ω(ρn) integral matchings.
Proof. Consider a family of SMC instances In = 〈M,W,U, V 〉 withM = {m1, . . . ,mn} andW = {w1, . . . , wn},350




. The (ternary) valuations of the agents are
defined as follows: For each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, U(mi, wi) = V (mi, wi) = 1. For each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n−12 },
U(m2i, w1) = U(m2i+1, w2i) = V (m2i, w2i+1) = α and V (m2i, w1) = V (m2i+1, w2i) = U(m2i, w2i+1) = 0.
Finally, U(mn, w1) = 0 and V (mn, w1) = α. For all remaining pairs (m,w) ∈M×W , U(m,w) = V (m,w) =
0. Figure 4a illustrates the SMC instance I5.355
Define µopt := {(m1, w1)} ∪
{
(m2i, w2i+1), (m2i+1, w2i) : i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n−12 }
}
(see Figure 4b). We also











































































Figure 4: Subfigure (a) illustrates the graph representation of the SMC instance In described in the proof of Theorem 3 for
n = 5. Subfigure (b) shows the matching µopt. Subfigures (c), (d), and (e) show the matchings µ(1), µ(2), and µ(3), respectively.
Dashed lines indicate zero-valuation pairs that do not appear in the graph representation.
the matching µ(i) (see Figures 4c and 4d) is the integral matching which is obtained from µopt by replacing
{(m1, w1), (m2i, w2i+1)} with {(m1, w2i+1), (m2i, w1)}, i.e.,
µ(i) :=
{
(m1, w2i+1) ∪ (m2i, w1) ∪ (m2i+1, w2i) ∪ {(m2`, w2`+1) ∪ (m2`+1, w2`)}`∈{1,2,...,n−12 }\{i}
}
.
Also, the matching µ(
n+1
2 ) (see Figure 4e) is the integral matching obtained from µopt by replacing





(m1, wn−1) ∪ (mn−1, wn) ∪ (mn, w1) ∪ {(m2`, w2`+1) ∪ (m2`+1, w2`)}`∈{1,2,...,n−32 }
}
.










µopt. Since α > n + 2 > n+12 , µ
is well-defined and has the matchings µopt and µ(i) for all i ∈
{
1, . . . , n+12
}
in its support. Notice that
W(µopt) = (n− 1)α+ 2 and W(µ(i)) = (n− 1)α for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n+12 }. Thus, W(µ) > (n− 1)α.
It can be verified that µ is stable. Indeed, we only need to check the blocking condition for the pairs
(mi, wi) with i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. We have that vw1(µ) ≥ 1 (since µ(
n+1
2 ) has weight 1α in µ and V (mn, w1) = α),360
um2i(µ) ≥ 1 for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n−12 } (since µ
(i) has weight 1α in µ and U(m2i, w1) = α), and vw2i+1(µ) ≥ 1
for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n−12 } (since µ
(i) has weight 1α in µ and V (m2i, w2i+1) = α). The welfare of the optimal
stable fractional matching must therefore be at least W(µ), and thus strictly greater than (n− 1)α.
We now claim that any ρ-efficient stable fractional matching µ′ satisfies µ′(mn, w1) > 0. Indeed, assuming
otherwise that µ′(mn, w1) = 0, the only pair that can give positive utility to man m1 and woman w1365
is (m1, w1). Hence, we must also have µ
′(m1, w1) = 1, and, as a result, µ
′(m2i, w1) = 0 for all i ∈{
1, 2, . . . , n−12
}
. Then, the only pair that can give positive utility to man m2i and woman w2i is (m2i, w2i),
and hence, it must also be that µ′(m2i, w2i) = 1. Consequently, the only pair that can give positive utility to
man m2i+1 and woman w2i+1 is (m2i+1, w2i+1) and, hence, we must have µ
′(m2i+1, w2i+1) = 1. The welfare
of matching µ′ would then be 2n, which is less than ρ(n− 1)α by the assumed bound on α. In other words,370
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the welfare of µ′ would be less than ρ times the welfare of the stable fractional matching µ, contradicting
the assumption that µ′ is ρ-efficient.
The final step in the proof involves showing that for any stable fractional matching µ′ with support of
size at most n−12 ρ, we must have W(µ
′) < ρ(n − 1)α; the desired bound on the support size would then




1, 2, . . . n−12
}
: µ′(m2i, w1) > 0
}
, and T :=
{
1, 2, . . . n−12
}
\T .375
Since µ′ has support of size at most n−12 ρ and µ
′(mn, w1) > 0, it holds that |T | ≤ n−12 ρ− 1.
For every i ∈ T , the agents m2i, w2i, m2i+1, and w2i+1 can together contribute at most 2α to the welfare.
On the other hand, when i ∈ T , we have µ′(m2i, w1) = 0, and the only pair that can give positive utility to
man m2i and woman w2i is (m2i, w2i). Therefore, we must have that µ
′(m2i, w2i) = 1. Consequently, the
only pair that can give positive utility to man m2i+1 and woman w2i+1 is (m2i+1, w2i+1), and it follows that
µ′(m2i+1, w2i+1) = 1. Therefore, when i ∈ T , the agents m2i, w2i, m2i+1, and w2i+1 can together contribute
at most 4 to the welfare. Taking the possible contribution of pair (m1, w1) into account, we have that
W(µ′) ≤ 2 + 2α|T |+ 4|T | = 2n+ (2α− 4)|T |
≤ 2n+ ρ(n− 1)α− 2α− 2(n− 1)ρ+ 4 < ρ(n− 1)α.
The equality follows from the definition of T , the second inequality follows from the bound on |T | above,
and the third one from the definition of α. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
Theorem 3 has an interesting algorithmic implication. The fact that the support size can be large even for
approximately optimal solutions suggests that a support enumeration strategy—which has proven useful in380
other economic problems [56, 57]—will be strictly more demanding than any of the MILP-based approaches
in Section 2.1. Specifically, a brute force enumeration of all subsets of Ω(ρn) matchings requires Ω((n!)ρn) ≈
Ω(nρn
2
) time. By contrast, the MILPs (OPT-Stab) and (OPT-Thresh) described in Section 2.1 require
O(2n2) and O(nn) time, respectively. A similar comparison can be made for optimal ε-stable fractional
matchings. Interestingly, as we will show in Section 4, an ε-stable fractional matching of small support can385
be easily computed, and provides nearly the best approximation ratios achievable by efficient algorithms
(under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions).
4. Algorithmic results
We begin the discussion of our algorithmic results with binary valuations. In this setting, Optimal
Stable Fractional Matching reduces to computing a maximum weight matching on a specific weighted390
graph associated with the given instance.
Theorem 4. Given an SMC instance I = 〈M,W,U, V 〉 with binary valuations, an optimal stable fractional
matching for I is, without loss of generality, integral, and can be computed in polynomial time.
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2 + 1n2 if U(m,w) = V (m,w) = 1,
1 if U(m,w) = 1, V (m,w) = 0 or U(m,w) = 0, V (m,w) = 1,
0 otherwise.
Thus, for any integral matching µ in G, if nµ denotes the number of agents (men and women) with utility 1
in the SMC instance I, then nµ ≤
∑
(m,w)∈µ γ(m,w) < nµ + 1.395
Let µ be a maximum weight matching in G. Note that µ can be computed in polynomial time and is,
without loss of generality, integral. Also, it follows from the above inequality that µ is an optimal matching
for I. We will now argue that µ is stable. Indeed, assuming otherwise, any blocking pair (m,w) must have
0 = um(µ) < U(m,w) = 1, 0 = vw(µ) < V (m,w) = 1 and (m,w) /∈ µ. Thus, if µ contains one or both of
the edges (m,w′) and (m′, w) for some w′ 6= w and m′ 6= m, then we must have that U(m,w′) = 0 and/or400
V (m′, w) = 0. By our definition of weights, this would imply that γ(m,w′) = 1 and/or γ(m′, w) = 1. We
can now replace one or both of these edges with the edge (m,w), which has weight γ(m,w) = 2 + 1/n2, and
obtain a new matching with strictly larger weight—a contradiction.
The proof of Theorem 4 can be easily extended to the non-bipartite setting (also known as the stable
roommates problem) to compute an optimal stable fractional matching with binary valuations.405
Next, we consider general valuations and show how to exploit stable integral matchings to get an approx-
imate solution for Optimal Stable Fractional Matching. Let σmax and σmin denote the largest and
the smallest non-zero valuation among all agents in I, respectively. We call a man-woman pair (m,w) light if
either U(m,w) = 0 or V (m,w) = 0, and heavy otherwise. Given an SMC instance I as input, our algorithm
computes a stable integral matching for I, say µ, in two steps: First, it computes a stable integral matching410
µ1 using only the heavy pairs (and taking into account the stability constraints in heavy pairs only). Then,
it completes the solution with a matching µ2 of maximum welfare using the light pairs subject to feasibility
constraints, i.e., using light pairs that do not share any agents with the pairs in µ1. The light pairs impose
no additional constraints on stability, so the resulting matching is stable.
We will show that µ has approximation ratio 1 + σmax/σmin (recall that σmax and σmin are the largest415
and the smallest non-zero valuations, respectively, in the instance I). Let µopt be an optimal matching for
I. Also, let µopt1 be the set of pairs of µopt that share an agent with some pair of µ1, i.e., µ
opt
1 := {(m,w) ∈
µopt : at least one of m or w is matched in µ1}. By definition of µ2, we have W(µ2) ≥ W(µopt \ µopt1 ). To
complete the proof, we will need the following lemma.
Lemma 2. W(µ1 \ µopt1 ) ≥ (1 + σmax/σmin)
−1W(µopt1 \ µ1).420
Proof. Our proof constructs a mapping in which every pair (m,w) ∈ µopt1 \µ1 is mapped to one of its agents,
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whom we will call the witness of the pair. The mapping is such that the utility of the witness in the matching
µ1 \ µopt1 is at least (1 + σmax/σmin)
−1
(U(m,w) + V (m,w)). Note that once we establish the said mapping,
the proof will follow, since each agent can be the witness of at most one pair of µopt1 \ µ1 and W(µ1 \ µ
opt
1 )
is at least the total utility of the witnesses in µ1 \ µopt1 .425
Consider a light pair (m,w) ∈ µopt1 \µ1. The witness is an agent (m or w) who also belongs to a pair of µ1\
µopt1 ; such an agent certainly exists by the definition of µ
opt
1 . Since all pairs of µ1\µ
opt
1 are heavy, the utility of
the witness of (m,w) in µ1\µopt1 is at least σmin = σminσmax (0+σmax) ≥ (1 + σmax/σmin)
−1
(U(m,w) + V (m,w)),
since (m,w) is light.
Now consider a heavy pair (m,w) ∈ µopt1 \µ1. If µ1 contains a pair (m,w′) with U(m,w′) ≥ U(m,w), select430
agent m to be the witness, otherwise select agent w. Note that in the latter case, stability of µ1 implies the
existence of (m′, w) ∈ µ1 such that V (m′, w) ≥ V (m,w). Hence, the utility of the witness of (m,w) in µ1\µopt1
is at least min{U(m,w), V (m,w)}, which, in turn, is at least (1 + σmax/σmin)−1 (U(m,w) + V (m,w)).
Now, Lemma 2 gives the desired approximation ratio, as follows:
W(µ) =W(µ1) +W(µ2) =W(µ1 \ µopt1 ) +W(µ1 ∩ µ
opt
1 ) +W(µ2)
≥ (1 + σmax/σmin)−1W(µopt1 \ µ1) +W(µ
opt
1 ∩ µ1) +W(µopt \ µ
opt
1 )
≥ (1 + σmax/σmin)−1W(µopt).
For ternary valuations in {0, 1, α}, the above algorithm gives a (1 + α)-approximation. An improved
approximation for ternary valuations can be achieved using the following modification: When computing435
the stable integral matching, resolve ties in favour of the pairs (m,w) with the highest U(m,w) + V (m,w).
The next lemma establishes an improved approximation ratio of max{2, α}.
Lemma 3. The modified algorithm for SMC instances with ternary valuations in {0, 1, α} satisfies W(µ1 \





Proof. For a pair (m,w) of matching µopt1 \µ1, we use the term neighborhood to refer to the pairs of µ1 \µ
opt
1440
that use agent m or w. We will show that the total utility from pairs in the neighborhood of (m,w) is at
least min{1, 2/α} (U(m,w) + V (m,w)). Since each pair of µ1 \ µopt1 can be in the neighborhood of at most
two pairs of µopt1 \ µ1, this will give us the desired inequality.
Indeed, by the particular way we resolve ties in the ordinal preferences before computing the matching
µ1, a heavy pair (m,w) in µ
opt
1 \µ1 must have a pair of utility at least U(m,w)+V (m,w) in its neighborhood.445
A light pair (m,w) has U(m,w) + V (m,w) ≤ α and certainly has a heavy pair of utility at least 2 in its
neighborhood.
The above discussion is summarized in the following statement.
18
Theorem 5. There is a polynomial-time algorithm which, given an SMC instance I with an optimal match-
ing µopt, computes a stable integral matching µ with W(µ) ≥ min{ 12 ,
1
α}W(µ
opt) if I has ternary valuations450
in {0, 1, α}, and W(µ) ≥ (1 + σmax/σmin)−1W(µopt) in general, where σmax and σmin denote the highest
and lowest non-zero valuation in I, respectively.
We conclude this section by considering approximate stability. For general valuations, we present a
polynomial-time 1/ε-approximation algorithm for Optimal ε-Stable Fractional Matching, which con-
structs an ε-stable fractional matching with a small support by combining an optimal matching with a stable455
integral matching.
Theorem 6. There is a polynomial-time algorithm that given any SMC instance I = 〈M,W,U, V 〉 and any
rational ε ∈ [0, 1], computes a fractional matching µ that is ε-stable for I such that W(µ) ≥ εW(µopt), where
µopt is an optimal matching for I.
Proof. Let µs be any stable integral matching and µopt be an optimal matching for I. Note that both µs460
and µopt can be computed in polynomial time. We will show that µ := (1− ε)µs + εµopt satisfies the desired
properties. Indeed, W(µ) = (1 − ε)W(µs) + εW(µopt) ≥ εW(µopt). Furthermore, since µs is stable, we
have that for any man-woman pair (m,w) ∈ M ×W , either um(µs) ≥ U(m,w) or vw(µs) ≥ V (m,w). The
former condition implies that um(µ) ≥ (1 − ε)um(µs) ≥ (1 − ε)U(m,w), while the latter condition gives
vw(µ) ≥ (1− ε)V (m,w). Either way, the pair (m,w) is ε-stable.465
In particular, Theorem 6 shows that a 12 -stable fractional matching with welfare at least half of that
of an optimal fractional matching (and therefore, that of an optimal stable fractional matching) can be
computed in polynomial time. In Section 10, we provide a slightly stronger welfare guarantee: There is a
polynomial-time algorithm that computes a 12 -stable fractional matching with welfare at least that of an
optimal (exactly) stable fractional matching.470
5. Hardness of approximation
In this section, we present our inapproximability statements, which are by far the technically most
involved results in the paper. We present polynomial-time reductions which, given a 3SAT formula φ of a
particular structure, construct SMC instances that simulate the evaluation of φ for every variable assignment.
The constructed SMC instances consist of several gadgets including an accumulator. The simulation of the475
evaluation of φ by the SMC instance is such that:
(a) when φ has a satisfying assignment, there is a stable (or ε-stable) fractional matching where the
contribution of the agents in the accumulator gadget to the welfare can be large and dominates the
contribution from the remaining SMC instance, and
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(b) when φ is not satisfiable, the contribution of the accumulator and, subsequently, the total welfare of480
any stable (or ε-stable) fractional matching is very small.
Hence, distinguishing between SMC instances with stable (or ε-stable) fractional matchings of very high
and very low welfare would allow us to decide 3SAT. We have two inapproximability statements: Theo-
rem 7 for Optimal Stable Fractional Matching and Theorem 8 for Optimal ε-Stable Fractional
Matching.485
Theorem 7. For every constant δ > 0, it is NP-hard to approximate Optimal Stable Fractional
Matching for SMC instances with ternary valuations in {0, 1, α}to within a factor of (i) α − 1/2 − δ if
α = O(n), and (ii) Ω(n1−δ) otherwise.
Theorem 8. For any constant ε ∈ (0, 0.03] and δ > 0, it is NP-hard to approximate Optimal ε-Stable
Fractional Matching to within a factor of 1/ε− δ.490
We will prove Theorem 7 here; the proof of Theorem 8, which uses similar gadgets but is slightly more
involved, appears in Section 9. Since the proof is long, we have divided it into three parts: the description
of the reduction (Section 5.1), technical claims with gadget properties (Section 5.2), and the proof of the
inapproximability result (Section 5.3).
5.1. The reduction495
In particular, we present a polynomial-time reduction from 2P2N-3SAT, the special case of 3SAT con-
sisting of 3-CNF clauses in which every variable appears four times: twice as a positive literal and twice
as a negative one. 2P2N-3SAT is known to be NP-hard [58]. Our reduction takes as input an instance
of 2P2N-3SAT consisting of N (boolean) variables x1, x2, . . . , xN , and a 3-CNF formula φ with L = 4N/3
clauses c1, c2, . . . , cL. Without loss of generality, we assume that each clause in φ consists of distinct literals.500
Given the instance of 2P2N-3SAT, our reduction generates an instance I = 〈M,W,U, V 〉 of Optimal
Stable Fractional Matching. As usual, we denote by n the number of men (or women) in I. We will
use a positive integer parameter k which will determine the size of n; in particular, n = O(N +k). We define
I by referring to its graph representation, which consists of variable gadgets, clause gadgets, variable-clause
connectors, an accumulator, and clause-accumulator connectors. For each gadget, we classify the edges (i.e.,505
man-woman pairs and their valuations) into the following three types:
• man-heavy edges (m,w) with U(m,w) = α and V (m,w) = 0,
• woman-heavy edges (m,w) with U(m,w) = 0 and V (m,w) = α, and

















































Figure 5: (a) The variable gadget corresponding to the variable x. (b) The clause gadget corresponding to the clause c and its
CA-connector (mc, wc).
Recall that any pair (m,w) that does not appear as an edge in the graph representation has U(m,w) =510
V (m,w) = 0.
The instance I has a variable gadget for every variable x, which consists of five men mx1 , mx2 , ex1 , ex2 ,















































1 ), as shown in Figure 5a.
For every clause c, instance I has a clause gadget with three men mc, ec1, ec2, three women wc1, wc2, wc3,515
and the nine balanced edges between them, as shown in Figure 5b.
For every appearance of a literal in a clause, there is a variable-clause connector (or VC-connector). The
structure of VC-connectors depends on whether they correspond to positive or negative literals and the value
of α. In each case, we identify one edge of the VC-connector as the input, and either one or two edges as the
output.520
Specifically, for every positive literal x whose i-th appearance (i ∈ {1, 2}) is as the j-th literal (j ∈
{1, 2, 3}) of clause c, I has a VC-connector defined as follows:
• When α ≥ 2, the VC-connector consists of a single woman-heavy edge between mxi (from the variable
gadget corresponding to variable x) and wcj (from the clause gadget corresponding to clause c), as
shown in Figure 6a. This edge is simultaneously the input and the output edge of the VC-connector.525
• When α ∈ (3/2, 2), the VC-connector consists of woman wx,c, man mx,c, the woman-heavy edges
(mxi , w
x,c) and (mx,c, wcj), and the balanced edge (m
x,c, wx,c), as shown in Figure 6b. Here, (mxi , w
x,c)
is the input and (mx,c, wcj) is the output edge.
For every negative literal x whose i-th appearance (i ∈ {1, 2}) is as the j-th literal (j ∈ {1, 2, 3}) of clause
c, I has a VC-connector defined as follows:530











































Figure 6: VC-connectors corresponding to clause c and positive literal x for (a) α ≥ 2 and (b) α ∈ (3/2, 2), and to clause c and
negative literal x for (c) α ≥ 2 and (d) α ∈ (3/2, 2).
the balanced edge (mx,c, wx,c), and the woman-heavy edge (mx,c, wcj), as shown in Figure 6c. Here,
(mx,c, wxi ) is the input and (m
x,c, wcj) is the output edge.












































3 ), as shown in
Figure 6d. In this case, the VC-connector has one input edge (mx,c1 , w
x





and (mx,c3 , w
c
j).
The accumulator (Figure 7) of instance I has different structure depending on the value of α. Its size
depends on the positive integer parameter k.540
• When α ≥ 2 (see Figure 7a), the accumulator consists of man mi and woman wi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k},
men e1i and e
2
i and woman f
1
i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k−1}, man e3i and women f2i and f3i for all i ∈ {2, . . . , k},





for all i ∈ {2, . . . , k} and (e2i , wi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, balanced edges (m1, wc) for every clause
c, which we call tine edges, (e1i , wi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, and (mi, f2i ) for all i ∈ {2, . . . , k}, and545
woman-heavy edges (mi, wi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, (e1i , f1i ) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, and (mi, f3i ) for


























































































































Figure 7: The accumulator for the cases (a) α ≥ 2 and (b) α ∈ (3/2, 2).
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• When α ∈ (3/2, 2) (see Figure 7b), the accumulator consists of man mi, woman wi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k},
man e1i and woman f
1
i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, man e2i and woman f2i for all i ∈ {2, . . . , k}, and





all i ∈ {2, . . . , k} and (mi, f2i−1) for all i ∈ {3, . . . , k}, the balanced edges (m1, wc) for every clause c
(tine edges), (e1i , wi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k− 1} and (mi, f2i ) for all i ∈ {2, . . . , k}, and the woman-heavy
edges (mi, wi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and (e1i , f1i ) and (e1i , wi+1) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}.
Finally, instance I has a clause-accumulator connector (or CA-connector) for every clause c of φ consisting
of the woman-heavy edge (mc, wc) between the man mc (from the clause gadget corresponding to clause c)555
and woman wc (from the accumulator); see Figure 5b. Notice that the above construction has more women
than men. To restore balance, we pad the instance with extra (isolated) men that neither value nor are
valued by any other agent. This completes the construction of the reduced instance.
5.2. Gadget properties
We will now prove several important properties (Claims 1-4) of our construction.560
Claim 1. For every variable x, a stable fractional matching µ satisfies at least one of the following:
(1) µ(mx1 , w
x




















2 ) = 1.
(2) µ(mx1 , w
x




















2 ) = 1.
Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that for some i, j ∈ {1, 2}, we have µ(mxi , wx1 )+µ(mxi , wx2 )+µ(mxi , fxi ) < 1
and µ(mx1 , w
x












j will have utility strictly less than 1 in565
µ, and thus the pair (mxi , w
x
j ) would be blocking.
We remark that the two conditions in the statement of Claim 1 affect the weight of the input edges of
the VC-connectors that are attached to the variable gadget in any stable fractional matching. In particular,
condition (1) implies that the weight assigned to the input edges of the VC-connectors that correspond to
the two appearances of the positive literal x in clauses must be 0. To see why, observe that these input edges570
are incident to nodes mx1 and m
x
2 , and the total weight of all edges incident to each of these nodes cannot
exceed 1. Condition (2) has a similar implication for the edges associated with the negative literal x.
Claim 2. Any stable fractional matching that assigns a weight of 0 to the input edge of a VC-connector
must assign a weight of 0 to its output edge(s) as well.
Proof. For α ≥ 2, the claim holds trivially for VC-connectors corresponding to positive literals (Figure 6a).575
Consider a VC-connector corresponding to a negative literal x and a clause c containing it (Figure 6c).
Observe that, besides the input edge (mx,c, wxi ), the edge (m
x,c, wx,c) is the only balanced or man-heavy
24
edge that is incident to man mx,c and the only balanced (or woman-heavy) edge incident to woman wx,c.
Hence, stability of the edge (mx,c, wx,c) requires a weight of 1 assigned to it when the weight assigned to
input edge (mx,c, wxi ) is 0. Then, the output edge (m
x,c, wcj), which is also incident to the node m
x,c, must580
have a weight of 0 as well.
We now consider the case α ∈ (3/2, 2). First consider a VC-connector corresponding to a positive literal
x and a clause c containing it (Figure 6b). The edge (mx,c, wx,c) is the only balanced or man-heavy edge
that is incident to man mx,c and, besides the input edge (mxi , w
x,c), the only balanced (or woman-heavy)
edge incident to woman wx,c. Hence, stability of edge (mx,c, wx,c) requires a weight of 1 assigned to it when585
the weight assigned to edge (mxi , w
x,c) is 0. Then, the output edge (mx,c, wcj), which is also incident to node
mx,c, must have a weight of 0 as well.
Finally, consider a VC-connector corresponding to a negative literal x and a clause c containing it (Fig-
ure 6d). Observe that (mx,c1 , w
x,c
1 ) is the only balanced or woman-heavy edge that is incident to woman




i ), the only balanced or man-heavy edge incident to man m
x,c
1 .590
Also, (mx,c2 , w
x,c
2 ) is the only balanced or man-heavy edge that is incident to man m
x,c
2 and, besides edge
(mx,c1 , w
x,c
2 ), the only balanced or woman-heavy edge to woman w
x,c




3 ) is the only









the only balanced or man-heavy edge incident to man mx,c3 .
Hence, stability of edge (mx,c1 , w
x,c
1 ) requires a weight of 1 assigned to it when the weight assigned to edge595
(mx,c1 , w
x








1 ) must have a weight of 0. Then, stability of edge
(mx,c2 , w
x,c









must have a weight of 0. Then, stability of edge (mx,c3 , w
x,c
3 ) requires a weight of 1 assigned to it. Hence,
the output edge (mx,c3 , w
c
j) must have a weight of 0 as well.
Claim 3. Any stable fractional matching that assigns a weight of 0 to all output edges of the VC-connectors600
of clause c must assign a weight of 0 to the CA-connector of clause c as well.
Proof. Let `1, `2, and `3 be the literals of clause c. Consider, for the sake of contradiction, a stable fractional
matching that assigns (1) a weight of 0 to all output edges of the VC-connectors corresponding to literals `i
and clause c, and (2) strictly positive weight to edge (mc, wc) of the CA-connector for clause c. Note that
condition (2) implies that the total weight on the edges (mc, wc1), (m
c, wc2) and (m
c, wc3) is strictly smaller605
than 1. Since these are the only balanced or man-heavy edges incident to man mc, the stability of these











i ), and (m
c, wci ) are
the only balanced or woman-heavy edges incident to agent wci for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Along with condition (1),
this implies that the weight assigned to these three edges is at least 1. Hence, the total weight on the nine610




violating the definition of a fractional matching.
Claim 4. Any stable fractional matching that assigns a weight of 0 to some CA-connector must assign a
total weight of 1 to the tine edges and a weight of 1 to every balanced edge of the accumulator.




) of the CA-connector corresponding615
to some clause c′. Since this is the only woman-heavy edge that is incident to agent wc
′
and there is no
man-heavy edge incident to agent m1, stability on the edge (m1, w
c′) requires that the total weight of the
tine edges (m1, w
c) (for every clause c) is (at least) 1. Hence, the weight of the edge (m1, w1) is 0. We
will complete the proof by distinguishing between the two different accumulator structures, depending on
whether α ≥ 2 or α ∈ (3/2, 2).620
When α ≥ 2, it suffices to show that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k− 1}, if the weight of edge (mi, wi) is 0, then the
weight of the balanced edges (e1i , wi) and (mi+1, f
2
i+1) is 1 and the weight of edge (mi+1, wi+1) is 0. Indeed,
observe that, edge (e1i , wi) is the only balanced or man-heavy edge incident to man e
1
i and, besides edge
(mi, wi), the only balanced or woman-heavy edge incident to woman wi. Hence, the balanced edge (e
1
i , wi)
must have a weight of 1 and the edge (mi+1, wi) a weight of 0.625
Then, edge (mi+1, f
2
i+1) is the only balanced or woman-heavy edge incident to woman f
2
i+1 and, besides
edge (mi+1, wi), the only balanced or man-heavy edge incident to man mi+1. Hence, the balanced edge
(mi+1, f
2
i+1) must have a weight of 1 and the edge (mi+1, wi+1) a weight of 0.
When α ∈ (3/2, 2), it suffices to show that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, if the weight of the edge (mi, wi)
(and, if they exist, the edges (e1i−1, wi) and (mi+1, f
2





i+1) is 1, and the weight of the edges (mi+1, wi+1) and (e
1
i , wi+1) (and, if it exists, the edge
(mi+2, f
2
i+1)) is 0. Indeed, observe that the edge (e
1
i , wi) is the only balanced or man-heavy edge incident
to man e1i . Furthermore, in addition to the edge (mi, wi) (and, if it exists, the edge (e
1
i−1, wi)), it is the
only balanced or woman-heavy edge incident to woman wi. Hence, the balanced edge (e
1
i , wi) must have a
weight of 1, and the edge (mi+1, wi) (and, if it exists, the edge (e
1
i , wi+1)) must have a weight of 0. Then,635
the edge (mi+1, f
2
i+1) is, besides (mi+1, f
2
i ) and (mi+1, wi), the only balanced or man-heavy edge incident to
man mi+1, and the only balanced or woman-heavy edge incident to woman f
2
i+1. Hence, the balanced edge
(mi+1, f
2
i+1) must have a weight of 1, and the edge (mi+1, wi+1) (and, if it exists, the edge (mi+2, f
2
i+1))
must have a weight of 0.
5.3. Proof of inapproximability640
Lemma 4. If formula φ is not satisfiable, then any stable fractional matching of I has welfare at most
80αN + 4(k − 1).
Proof. We will first show that if φ is not satisfiable, then any stable fractional matching of I assigns weight
0 to some CA-connector. For the sake of contradiction, consider a stable fractional matching that assigns
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a strictly positive weight to all CA-connectors. We will construct a truth assignment for the formula φ645
(contradicting the assumption of the lemma) by repeating the following process for every clause c of φ: Let
` be a literal that appears in c such that the output edge(s) of the VC-connector, that corresponds to the
appearance of ` in c, have strictly positive total weight. By Claim 3, such a literal must exist. We set ` to 1
(true). For every variable that has not received a value in this way, we arbitrarily set it to 1.
The above assignment satisfies all the clauses. To show that it is also valid, we need to argue that there650
is no variable x such that both literals x and x have been set to 1. Assume, to the contrary, that literal x
is set to 1 due to its appearance in a clause c1, and literal x is set to 1 due to its appearance in a different
clause c2. Thus, in the above assignment, the output edge(s) of the VC-connector between the literal x
and the clause c1, as well as the VC-connector between the literal x and the clause c2 have strictly positive
(total) weight. By Claim 2, the input edges of both VC-connectors also have strictly positive weight. Let655
i1, i2 ∈ {1, 2} be such that the i1-th appearance of x is in the clause c1 and the i2-th appearance of x is in
the clause c2. Therefore, the said input edges are incident to the nodes m
x
i1
and wxi2 . Using Claim 1, we get
that the total weight on the edges incident to one of mxi1 or w
x
i2
exceeds 1, contradicting feasibility. Thus, the
above assignment must be valid, which, in turn, implies that any stable fractional matching assigns weight
0 to some CA-connector.660
By Claim 4, the contribution of the accumulator to the welfare is exactly 4k − 2 (2 from the tine edges
plus 2 from each balanced edge). Let us now consider the contribution of the edges that do not belong to
the accumulator. This comprises of
• a total value of 20 for the ten balanced edges of each of the N variable gadgets,
• a total value of α (respectively, 2 + 2α) for the edges of each of the 2N VC-connectors corresponding665
to a positive literal when α ≥ 2 (respectively, α ∈ (3/2, 2)),
• a total value of 2+2α (respectively, 6+6α) for the edges of each of the 2N VC-connectors corresponding
to a negative literal when α ≥ 2 (respectively, α ∈ (3/2, 2)),
• a total value of 18 + α for the nine balanced edges of each of the 4N/3 clause gadgets and their
corresponding CA-connectors.670
It can be easily seen that 80αN − 2 is a (loose) upper bound on the total value from these edges.
Lemma 5. If φ is satisfiable, then there exists a stable fractional matching of I with welfare at least 4(k −
1)(α− 1/2).
Proof. Starting from a satisfying assignment for φ, we will construct a stable fractional matching µ in which
the welfare of the accumulator gadget is at least 4(k − 1)(α− 1/2).675
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Variable gadgets.. For the edges of the variable gadget of the variable x, µ is defined as:
• If x is true, then µ(mx1 , wx1 ) = µ(ex3 , wx1 ) = µ(ex3 , wx2 ) = µ(mx2 , wx2 ) = 1/2, µ(ex1 , fx1 ) = µ(ex2 , fx2 ) = 1,
and the remaining edges have weight 0.
• If x is false, then µ(ex3 , wx1 ) = µ(ex3 , wx2 ) = 1/2, µ(mx1 , fx1 ) = µ(mx2 , fx2 ) = 1, and the remaining edges
have weight 0.680
Clause gadgets and CA-connectors.. For each clause, select one of the true literals (tie-break arbitrarily)
and call it active. Note that each clause has an active literal in a satisfying assignment. Consider the clause
c, and let `i be its active literal for some i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Also, let i1, i2 ∈ {1, 2, 3} \ {i} denote the other two
indices. Set µ(ec1, w
c
i1
) = µ(ec2, w
c
i2
) = 1, and set the weight of the remaining balanced edges to 0. Assign a
weight of 1 to the CA-connector, i.e., µ(mc, wc) = 1.685
VC-connectors.. For every non-active VC-connector, set the weight of its balanced edges (if any) to 1 and
the weight of the remaining edges to 0. For every active VC-connector corresponding to the i-th appearance
of the positive literal x as the j-th literal of clause c (i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}), the weights of its edges are as
follows:
• When α ≥ 2, we set µ(mxi , wcj) = 1/2.690
• When α ∈ (3/2, 2), we set µ(mxi , wx,c) = 1/2, µ(mx,c, wx,c) = 1− α/2, and µ(mx,c, wcj) = 1/α.
For every active VC-connector corresponding to the i-th appearance of the negative literal x as the j-th
literal of clause c (i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}), the weights of its edges are as follows:
• When α ≥ 2, we set µ(mx,c, wxi ) = µ(mx,c, wcj) = 1/2 and µ(mx,c, wx,c) = 0.








2 ) = (α −695
1)/2, µ(mx,c2 , w
x,c



















j) = 1− 1/α.
Accumulator.. We set µ(m1, w
c) = 0 for every tine edge (m1, w
c) of the accumulator. Furthermore:
• When α ≥ 2, we set µ(mi, wi) = 1/α for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, µ(e2i , wi) = 1 − 2/α, µ(mi+1, wi) = 1/α,
µ(e1i , f
1
i ) = 1, µ(e
1
i , wi) = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, µ(mi, f2i ) = 0, µ(mi, f3i ) = 1 − 2/α, and700
µ(e3i , f
2
i ) = 1 for all i ∈ {2, . . . , k}. Among these, any edge with a positive weight is either man- or
woman-heavy, and hence, its contribution to the social welfare is α times its weight. It can be verified
that the total contribution is 4(k − 1)(α− 1/2) + 1.
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• When α ∈ (3/2, 2), we set µ(m1, w1) = 1/α, µ(m2, w2) = α + 1/α − 2, µ(mi, wi) = 1 − 1/α for all
i ∈ {3, . . . , k}, µ(mi+1, wi) = 1− 1/α for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, µ(e1i , wi) = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1},705
µ(m2, f
2
2 ) = 2 − α, µ(mi, f2i ) = 0 for all i ∈ {3, . . . , k}, µ(e11, f11 ) = α − 1, µ(e22, f22 ) = α − 2/α,
µ(e2k, f
2




i ) = 2−2/α for all i ∈ {2, . . . , k−1}, µ(e2i , f2i ) = 2−2/α for all i ∈ {3, . . . , k−1},
µ(e11, w2) = 2−α, µ(e1i , wi+1) = 2/α−1 for all i ∈ {2, . . . , k−1}, and µ(mi+1, f2i ) = 2/α−1 for all i ∈
{2, . . . , k−1}. Except for the balanced edge (m2, f22 ), every edge with a positive weight among the ones
listed above is either man- or woman-heavy, and hence, its contribution to the social welfare is α times710
its weight. It can be verified that the total contribution in this case is 4(k−1)(α−1/2) + 2α2−7α+ 7.
In each case, the accumulator contributes at least 4(k − 1)(α− 1/2) to the social welfare, as desired.
The feasibility of µ can be verified by inspection. To see why µ is stable, note that we only need to
check for the balanced edges, as the man- or woman-heavy edges and the remaining pairs do not impose any
constraints on stability. For the balanced edges, stability is established by the following series of observations715
(we will use the term ‘stabilized by’ to denote that an agent’s utility is at least 1): The variable gadget for













(if x is false). The clause gadget for clause c (Figure 5b) with active index i (and non-active indices i1 and









, wci2 ; in particular, the edge (m
c, wci ) is stabilized by w
c
i because
an active literal triggers the woman-heavy edge in the VC-connector. A VC connector is stabilized by wx,c720
(Figure 6b), mx,c (Figure 6c), or mx,c1 , w
x,c
2 , and m
x,c
3 (Figure 6d). Finally, the tine edges in the accumulator
(Figure 7) are stabilized by wc1 , . . . , wcL (because we trigger the CA-connector), and the remaining balanced
edges are stabilized by wi’s and mi’s except for m1. Overall, µ is a feasible stable fractional matching.
We are ready to prove Theorem 7. If α < N1+1/δ, we use our construction with any k satisfying
k − 1 ≥ 20αN(α−1/2−δ)δ . It is easy to verify that the reduction is polynomial-time. Furthermore, from
Lemma 4, we know that the welfare of µ when φ is not satisfiable is at most
80αN + 4(k − 1) ≤ 4(k − 1)δ
α− 1/2− δ
+ 4(k − 1) = 4(k − 1)(α− 1/2)
α− 1/2− δ
.
This number is at least α − 1/2 − δ times smaller than the welfare of µ when φ is satisfiable (Lemma 5).
This establishes the inapproximability bound in part (i) of Theorem 7.725
If α ≥ N1+1/δ, we use our construction with k = N1+1/δ. Once again, the reduction is polynomial-time,
and the instance I has n = Θ(N1+1/δ) men and women. Observe that α = Ω(n), k = Θ(n), and N = O(nδ).
Hence, the welfare of µ when φ is not satisfiable is at most
80αN + 4(k − 1) ≤ 80αN + 4N1+1/δ ≤ 84αN = O(αnδ).
On the other hand, the welfare of µ when φ is satisfiable is at least 4(k − 1)(α − 1/2), i.e., Ω(αn). This
establishes the bound in part (ii), and with it, completes the proof of Theorem 7.
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6. Concluding Remarks
We studied stable fractional matchings in a cardinal model and provided a number of computational
and structural results. Going forward, it would be very interesting to resolve the complexity of Optimal730
Stable Fractional Matching for the case when agents have strict cardinal preferences (i.e., the no-ties
case). It would also be very interesting to see if stronger inapproximability results can be obtained for more
general matching models, such as stable roommates [59]. Another relevant direction is to consider a stronger
solution concept with blocking coalitions of any size (also known as the core), wherein the deviating agents
can form a fractional matching among themselves to achieve a higher utility for each member of the coalition.735
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7. Comparison with other notions of stability870
In this section, we will discuss other notions of stability of fractional matchings that have been studied
for ordinal preferences. For a detailed overview of these and other notions, we refer the reader to the work
of Aziz and Klaus [46].
Given an SMC instance I = 〈M,W,U, V 〉 with cardinal preferences, we can define an ordinal instance
Iord = 〈M,W,〉 where := (m1 , . . . ,mn ,w1 , . . . ,wn) is a preference profile consisting of the ordinal875
preferences of the agents specified as weak total orders. Specifically, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, mi and wi
are weak total orders over the sets W and M , respectively, such that U(mi, w) ≥ U(mi, w′) ⇔ w mi w′
and V (m,wi) ≥ V (m′, wi)⇔ m wi m′. We will write w m w′ if w m w′ but not w′ m w. The relation
m w m′ is analogously defined.
Below we will discuss three notions of stability for fractional matchings—strong stability [11], fractional880
stability [40], and ex-post stability [11]—that were originally formulated in the context of strict ordinal
preferences, and were subsequently studied for weak preferences by Aziz and Klaus [46].
The first notion called strong stability asserts that no pair of man and woman should positively engage
with agents they like less than each other.
Definition 5 (Strong stability [11]). A fractional matching µ is strongly stable if there are no m,m′ ∈ M885
and w,w′ ∈W such that µ(m,w′) > 0, µ(m′, w) > 0, w m w′, and m w m′.
Next, recall that a fractional matching can be interpreted as a lottery (or a probability distribution) over
integral matchings. Under this interpretation, ex-post stability requires that every realization of this lottery
should be stable.
Definition 6 (Ex-post stability [11]). A fractional matching µ is ex-post stable if it can be expressed as a890
convex combination of integral stable matchings.
The third notion, fractional stability, formalizes the idea that “if man m is matched with someone less
preferred than woman w, then w should be matched with someone more preferred than m” as a linear
constraint.








µ(m′, w) ≥ 1.
Notice that an integral matching satisfies the ordinal notions of strong (Definition 5), ex-post (Defini-895
tion 6), or fractional (Definition 7) stability in Iord if and only if it satisfies the cardinal notion of stability
(Definition 1) in I. Thus, the distinction between these notions is meaningful only for fractional matchings.
The following observations describe the relationship between these notions (also refer to Figure 8).
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Strong stability (Definition 5)
Ex-post stability (Definition 6)
Fractional stability (Definition 7)
Stability (Definition 1)
Ordinal Preferences Cardinal Preferences
Figure 8: Relationship between stability notions for fractional matchings under ordinal and cardinal preferences. A solid
(respectively, dotted) arrow indicates that the implication holds (respectively, does not hold) in that direction. The implications
for strict and weak preferences are denoted by red and blue arrows, respectively.
• It is known that strong stability implies ex-post stability even under weak ordinal preferences, but the
converse is not true even under strict ordinal preferences [11, 46]. Additionally, for strict preferences, ex-900
post stability is known to be equivalent to fractional stability [40, 41, 11, 22], but for weak preferences,
the former is strictly stronger [46].
• A stable matching (Definition 1) may not be fractionally stable (Definition 7) even under strict pref-
erences. To see this, consider the fractional matching µ in Example 1, which was shown to be stable.








µ(m′, w3) = 0 + 0 + 0.5 < 1,
implying that µ is not fractionally stable (and thus also not ex-post/strongly stable).
Remark 3. It is interesting to note the welfare implication of the above observation. Since fraction-
ally stable matchings are equivalent to ex-post stable matchings under strict preferences, and since all905
integral stable matchings in Example 1 have social welfare of 7, it follows that the social welfare of
any fractionally stable matching is also equal to 7. On the other hand, there exists a stable matching
µ with a strictly higher welfare. This illustrates that fractionally stable (and, in particular, strongly
stable) matchings can be strictly suboptimal in the cardinal model, further justifying the need to study
the computational aspects of optimal stable matchings.910
• Given an SMC instance I, a strongly stable (Definition 5) matching in the corresponding ordinal
instance Iord can be shown to be stable (Definition 1) in the original instance I. Indeed, if µ is strongly
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stable in Iord, then for any pair (m,w) ∈ M ×W , we have that either
∑
w′:wmw′ µ(m,w
′) = 0 or∑
m′:mwm′ µ(m
′, w) = 0. Suppose, without loss of generality, that the former holds. Then, the utility
of man m in I is given by













• As mentioned previously in Remark 1, Narang and Narahari [55] have observed that the set of stable
matchings is non-convex even under strict cardinal preferences. Their counterexample involves the
convex combination of integral stable matchings, and therefore also establishes that an ex-post stable
(and hence also fractionally stable) matching may not be stable.915
8. Non-convexity of strong stability may not imply non-convexity of stability
In this section, we show that non-convexity of strong stability (Definition 5) might not imply the same
for stability (Definition 1), even though, as observed in Section 7, the former is a strictly stronger notion.
To this end, we revisit the counterexample used by Aziz and Klaus [46] in establishing the non-convexity of
the set of strongly stable matchings. Recall from Section 7 that a fractional matching µ is strongly stable if920
there are no m,m′ ∈M and w,w′ ∈W such that µ(m,w′) > 0, µ(m′, w) > 0, w m w′, and m w m′.
The counterexample of Aziz and Klaus [46, Theorem 1], which in turn is adapted from [11, Example 2],
consists of three men m1,m2,m3 and three women w1, w2, w3 with the following ordinal preferences:
m1 : w1  w2  w3 w1 : m2  m3  m1
m2 : w2  w3  w1 w2 : m3  m1  m2
m3 : w3  w1  w2 w3 : m1  m2  m3.
Consider the integral matchings µ(1), µ(2), and µ(3) defined as follows:
µ(1) := {(m1, w1), (m2, w2), (m3, w3)},
µ(2) := {(m1, w3), (m2, w1), (m3, w2)}, and
µ(3) := {(m1, w2), (m2, w3), (m3, w1)}.
Notice that µ(1), µ(2), and µ(3) are strongly stable (and therefore also stable). Also note that the frac-
tional matching µ := 13µ
(1) + 13µ
(2) + 13µ
(3) violates strong stability for the agents m1,m2 and w2, w3 since
37
µ(m1, w3) > 0, µ(m2, w2) > 0, w2m1 w3 and m1w2 m2. That is, the convex combination of strongly
stable integral matchings µ(1), µ(2), and µ(3) is not strongly stable.925
Let us now consider an SMC instance I = 〈M,W,U, V 〉 for the same set of agents, i.e., M = {m1,m2,m3},












Observe that the valuations in I are consistent with the aforementioned ordinal preferences. It is easy to
see that the utility of each agent in µ is equal to 1, and that µ is stable for I.
9. Hardness for ε-stability
The proof of Theorem 8 follows along very similar lines to the proof of Theorem 7, again using a reduction
from 2P2N-3SAT.930
9.1. The reduction
Starting from an instance of 2P2N-3SAT, we first preprocess and augment it in the following way. For
each variable of the original instance, we create a copy-variable and, for each clause of the original instance,
we create a copy-clause that contains the copy-variables corresponding to the variables of the original clause.
Each variable and its copy are coupled variables and, similarly, each clause and its copy are coupled clauses.935
Let the modified input consist of N (boolean) variables x1, x2, . . . , xN , and a 3-CNF formula φ with
L = 4N/3 clauses c1, c2,. . . , c4N/3. Note that if φ is not satisfiable, then, due to the instance augmentation,
there exist at least two clauses that are not satisfied.
We now proceed to describe the instance I = 〈M,W,U, V 〉 of Optimal ε-Stable Fractional Match-
ing whose graph representation consists of variable gadgets, clause gadgets, VC-connectors, an accumulator,940
and CA-connectors. We remark that I is not an instance with ternary valuations as we use valuations from
the set {0, 1, β, γ}. We set β = 2(1 − ε), and observe that, when ε < 0.03, we have that (3β2 + 4)ε < 1/2;
the value of γ will be set later. Again, we denote by n the number of men (or women) in I; the following
reduction is such that n = O(N).
For each gadget, we classify the edges into the following three types:945
• balanced edges (m,w) with U(m,w) = V (m,w) = 1,
• man-heavy edges (m,w) with U(m,w) > 0 and V (m,w) = 0, and






























































Figure 10: VC-connectors corresponding to (a) clause c and positive literal x, and (b) clause c and negative literal x.
Any other pair (m,w) that does not appear as an edge in the graph representation has U(m,w) = V (m,w) =
0.950
The instance I contains a variable gadget for every variable x, which consists of five men mx1 , mx2 , ex1 , ex2 ,















































1 ) (see Figure 9a).
For every clause c, instance I has a clause gadget with three men mc, ec1, ec2, three women wc1, wc2, wc3,
and the nine balanced edges between them (see Figure 9b).955
For every appearance of a literal in a clause, there is a variable-clause connector (or VC-connector)
whose structure depends on whether it corresponds to a positive or a negative literal. In particular, for
every positive literal x whose i-th appearance (i ∈ {1, 2}) is as the j-th literal (j ∈ {1, 2, 3}) of clause c,
instance I has a VC-connector that consists of a single woman-heavy edge between mxi (from the variable
gadget corresponding to variable x) and wcj (from the clause gadget corresponding to clause c) such that960
U(mxi , w
c




j) = β (see Figure 10a). This edge is simultaneously the input and output edge
of the VC-connector.
Similarly, for every negative literal x whose i-th appearance (i ∈ {1, 2}) is as the j-th literal (j ∈ {1, 2, 3})











Figure 11: The accumulator.
(mx,c, wxi ) with U(m
x,c, wxi ) = β and V (m
x,c, wxi ) = 0, the balanced edge (m
x,c, wx,c), and the woman-965
heavy edge (mx,c, wcj) with U(m
x,c, wcj) = 0 and V (m
x,c, wcj) = β (see Figure 10b). Here, (m
x,c, wxi ) is the
input and (mx,c, wcj) is the output edge.
The accumulator gadget consists of man m1, woman w1 and woman w
c for every clause c of φ. In
addition, it contains the balanced edges (m1, w
c) for every clause c, which we once again call tine edges and
the woman-heavy edge (m1, w1) with U(m1, w1) = 0 and V (m1, w1) = γ (see Figure 11).970
Finally, instance I contains a clause-accumulator connector (or CA-connector) for every clause c consist-
ing of the woman-heavy edge (mc, wc) between the man mc (from the clause gadget corresponding to clause
c) and woman wc (from the accumulator) so that U(mc, wc) = 0 and V (mc, wc) = 1 (see Figure 9b). Any
other edge (m,w) is such that U(m,w) = V (m,w) = 0.
Notice that the above construction has more women than men. To restore balance, we pad the in-975
stance with extra (isolated) men that neither value nor are valued by any other agent. This completes the
construction of the reduced instance.
9.2. Gadget properties
We will now prove several important properties (Claims 5-8) of our construction.
Claim 5. For every variable x, an ε-stable fractional matching µ satisfies at least one of the following980
conditions:
(1) µ(mx1 , w
x








1 ) ≥ 1− ε and µ(mx2 , wx1 ) + µ(mx2 , wx2 ) + µ(mx2 , fx2 ) ≥ 1− ε.
(2) µ(mx1 , w
x








1 ) ≥ 1− ε and µ(mx1 , wx2 ) + µ(mx2 , wx2 ) + µ(ex3 , wx2 ) ≥ 1− ε.
Proof. Assume otherwise that, for some i, j ∈ {1, 2}, µ(mxi , wx1 ) + µ(mxi , wx2 ) + µ(mxi , fxi ) < 1 − ε and
µ(mx1 , w
x








j ) < 1 − ε. Then, since instance I contains no man-heavy edge (mxi , w)985




j have utility less than 1 − ε in µ and hence the pair
(mxi , w
x
j ) is ε-blocking—a contradiction.
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As before, the two conditions in the statement of Claim 5 affect the weight of the input edges of the
VC-connectors that are attached to the variable gadget in any ε-stable fractional matching. Thus, condition
(1) implies that the weight assigned to each input edge of the VC-connectors that correspond to the two990
appearances of the positive literal x in clauses must be at most ε. To see why, observe that these input edges
are incident to nodes mx1 and m
x
2 , and the total weight of all edges incident to each of these nodes cannot
exceed 1. Similarly, condition (2) implies that the weight assigned to each input edge of the VC-connectors
that correspond to the two appearances of the negative literal x in clauses must be at most ε.
Claim 6. Any ε-stable fractional matching that assigns a weight of at most ε to the input edge of a VC-995
connector must assign a weight of at most βε to its output edge as well.
Proof. The claim holds trivially for VC-connectors corresponding to positive literals. Consider a VC-
connector corresponding to a negative literal x and a clause c containing it, and let ζ ≤ ε be the weight
assigned to the input edge (mx,c, wxi ). Observe that, besides the input edge (m
x,c, wxi ), the edge (m
x,c, wx,c)
is the only balanced or man-heavy edge that is incident to man mx,c and the only balanced (or woman-heavy)1000
edge incident to woman wx,c. Hence, ε-stability of edge (mx,c, wx,c) requires a weight of at least 1− ε− βζ
assigned to it. Then, the output edge, which is also incident to node mx,c, must have a weight of at most
ε+ (β − 1)ζ ≤ βε.
Claim 7. Any ε-stable fractional matching that assigns a weight of at most βε to each output edge of the
VC-connectors corresponding to clause c must assign a weight of at most 3(β2 + 1)ε to the CA-connector of1005
clause c as well.
Proof. Let `1, `2, and `3 be the literals of clause c. Consider, for the sake of contradiction, an ε-stable
fractional matching µ that assigns (1) a weight of at most βε to each output edge of the VC-connectors
corresponding to literals `i and clause c, and (2) a weight of more than 3(β
2 + 1)ε to edge (mc, wc) of the
CA-connector for clause c. Note that condition (2) implies that the total weight on the edges (mc, wc1),1010
(mc, wc2) and (m
c, wc3) is strictly smaller than 1−3(β2 +1)ε. Since these are the only balanced or man-heavy
edges incident to man mc, the ε-stability of these edges is guaranteed by a utility of (at least) 1− ε for each











i ), and (m
c, wci ) are
the only balanced or woman-heavy edges incident to agent wci for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Along with condition (1),1015
this implies that the weight assigned to these three edges is at least 1− (β2 + 1)ε. Hence, the total weight on
the nine edges of the clause gadget is at least 3− 3(β2 + 1)ε, which, by the definition of β, is strictly more
than 2 for the six edges incident to men ec1 and e
c
2, violating the definition of a fractional matching.
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Claim 8. Any ε-stable fractional matching that assigns a weight of at most 3(β2 + 1)ε to at least two CA-
connectors must assign a total weight of 1−ε to the tine edges and a weight of at most ε to the edge (m1, w1)1020
of the accumulator.
Proof. Assume that a weight of at most 3(β2 + 1)ε has been assigned to the edges (mc1 , wc1) and (mc2 , wc2)
of the CA-connectors corresponding to some clauses c1 and c2. Since these are the only edges for which
agents wc1 and wc2 have positive value, and there is no man-heavy edge incident to agent m1, stability on
the edges (m1, w
c1) and (m1, w
c2) requires that the total weight of the tine edges (m1, w
c) (for every clause1025
c) is (at least) 1 − ε. Indeed, since by the definition of β we have (3β2 + 4)ε < 1/2, it is not possible to
guarantee stability of the edges (m1, w
c1) and (m1, w
c2) by assigning weight at least 1− (3β2 + 4)ε to each
of them so that both wc1 and wc2 have utility at least 1− ε. Hence, the weight of the edge (m1, w1) of the
accumulator is at most ε.
9.3. Proof of inapproximability1030
Lemma 6. If formula φ is not satisfiable, then any ε-stable fractional matching of I has welfare at most
56βN + γε.
Proof. We will first show that if φ is not satisfiable, then any ε-stable fractional matching of I assigns weight
at most 3(β2+1)ε to at least two CA-connectors. For the sake of contradiction, consider an ε-stable fractional
matching that assigns weight at most 3(β2 + 1)ε to at most one CA-connector; let c be the relevant clause,1035
if such a clause exists. We will construct a truth assignment for formula φ (contradicting the assumption of
the lemma) by repeating the following process for every clause c′ 6= c of φ. Let ` be a literal that appears in
c′ such that the output edge of the VC-connector, that corresponds to the appearance of ` in c′, has weight
greater than βε. Recall that such a literal exists by Claim 7. We set ` to 1 (true). For every variable that
has not received a value in this way, we arbitrarily set it to 1.1040
The above assignment satisfies all clauses except possibly for clause c. Since clause c is coupled with
another clause ĉ that is satisfied, it suffices to assign one of the variables appearing in c the same value as its
corresponding coupled variable appearing in ĉ. To show that the assignment is also valid, we need to argue
that there is no variable x such that both literals x and x have been set to 1. Assume otherwise that this is
the case. Furthermore, assume that literal x was set to 1 due to its appearance in a clause c1, and that this is1045
its i1-th appearance (with i1 ∈ {1, 2}). Also, literal x was set to 1 due to its appearance in a different clause
c2, where x makes its i2-th appearance (again, i2 ∈ {1, 2}). Hence, the output edge of the VC-connector
that corresponds to literal x and clause c1 (respectively, the VC-connector that corresponds to literal x and
clause c2) has weight greater than βε. Then, by Claim 6, the input edges of both VC-connectors have weight
greater than ε. As these input edges are incident to nodes mxi1 and w
x
i2
, Claim 5 yields that the total weight1050
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in the edges incident to some of the nodes mxi1 and w
x
i2
is strictly higher than 1, contradicting the definition
of a fractional matching.
Since any ε-stable fractional matching assigns a weight of at most 3(β2+1)ε to at least two CA-connectors,
by Claim 8, the contribution of the accumulator to the welfare is at most 2(1 − ε) + γε (2(1 − ε) from the
tine edges plus γε from the accumulator). The upper bound follows by considering the sum of valuations of1055
all agents for edges that do not belong to the accumulator. This sum consists of
• total value of 20 for the ten balanced edges of each of the N variable gadgets,
• total value of β for the edges of each of the 2N VC-connectors corresponding to a positive literal,
• total value of 2 + 2β for the edges of each of the 2N VC-connectors corresponding to a negative literal,
• total value of 19 for the nine balanced edges of each of the 4N/3 clause gadgets and their corresponding1060
CA-connectors.
It can be easily seen that 56βN − 2(1− ε) is a (loose) upper bound on the total value from these edges.
Lemma 7. If φ is satisfiable, then there exists an ε-stable fractional matching on I that has welfare at least
γ.
Proof. Consider an assignment of boolean values to the variables that satisfies φ. We construct an ε-stable1065
fractional matching µ in I so that the contribution of the accumulator gadget to the welfare is at least γ.
Variable gadgets.. The weights on the edges of the variable gadget corresponding to variable x are:
• µ(mx1 , wx1 ) = µ(ex3 , wx1 ) = µ(ex3 , wx2 ) = µ(mx2 , wx2 ) = 1/2, µ(ex1 , fx1 ) = µ(ex2 , fx2 ) = 1, and µ(mx1 , fx1 ) =
µ(mx1 , w
x








1 ) = 0 if x is true, and
• µ(ex3 , wx1 ) = µ(ex3 , wx2 ) = 1/2, µ(mx1 , fx1 ) = µ(mx2 , fx2 ) = 1, µ(mx1 , wx1 ) = µ(mx2 , wx2 ) = µ(mx1 , wx2 ) =1070
µ(mx2 , w
x








2 ) = 0 if x is false.
Clause gadgets and CA-connectors.. For every clause we select arbitrarily one of the true literals of the
clause and call it active; since the assignment satisfies φ, there is certainly such a literal. Consider clause c
and let `i (with i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) be its active literal; let i1 and i2 be the indices from {1, 2, 3} than are different
than i. We set µ(ec1, w
c
i1
) = µ(ec2, w
c
i2
) = 1 and µ(ec1, w
c





) = µ(ec2, w
c





) = µ(mc, wci ) =1075
µ(mc, wci1) = µ(m
c, wci2) = 0. We also assign a weight of 1 to the CA-connector corresponding to c, i.e.,
µ(mc, wc) = 1.
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VC-connectors.. For every non-active VC-connector, we set the weight of its balanced edge, if it exists,
to 1 and the weight of the remaining edges to 0. For every active VC-connector corresponding to the




For every active VC-connector corresponding to the i-th appearance of the negative literal x as the j-
th literal of clause c (i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}), we set the weights of its edges as follows: µ(mx,c, wxi ) =
µ(mx,c, wcj) = 1/2 and µ(m
x,c, wx,c) = 0.
Accumulator.. We set µ(m1, w
c) = 0 for every tine edge (m1, w
c) of the accumulator. Furthermore, we set1085
µ(m1, w1) = 1. So, the contribution of the accumulator to the social welfare is γ, as desired.
It can be easily verified that the total weight of the edges that are incident to any node is at most 1.
Hence, µ is a valid fractional matching. Regarding stability, it suffices to verify that either the man or the
woman of a balanced pair has a utility of at least 1 − ε. Note that we only need to check for the balanced
edges, as the man- or woman-heavy edges and the remaining pairs do not impose any constraints on stability.1090
For the balanced edges, stability is established by the following series of observations (we will use the term
‘stabilized by’ to denote that an agent’s utility is at least 1 − ε): The variable gadget for the variable x












2 (if x is false).
The clause gadget for clause c (Figure 9b) with active index i (and non-active indices i1 and i2) is stabilized







, wci2 ; in particular, the edge (m
c, wci ) is stabilized by w
c
i because an active literal1095
triggers the woman-heavy edge in the VC-connector. A VC connector is stabilized by mx,c (Figure 10b).
Finally, the tine edges in the accumulator (Figure 11) are stabilized by wc1 , . . . , wcL (because we trigger the
CA-connector). Overall, µ is a feasible stable fractional matching.
We are ready to prove Theorem 8. We select a value of γ such that γ ≥ 56βN(1/ε−δ)εδ . By Lemma 6, the
welfare of µ if φ was not satisfiable would be at most






By Lemma 7, we have that the welfare of µ if φ was not satisfiable would be at least 1/ε− δ times smaller
than the welfare I could have if φ was satisfiable.1100
10. Approximation Algorithm for 1
2
-stability
We will now provide a polynomial-time algorithm that computes a 12 -stable fractional matching with
welfare at least that of an optimal (exactly) stable fractional matching. Notice that unlike Theorems 5
and 6, where the quality of the computed matching is compared to the optimal matching µopt, the guarantee
in Theorem 9 is considerably weaker.1105
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Theorem 9. Let I be an SMC instance and µ∗ be an optimal stable fractional matching for I. Then, a
1
2 -stable fractional matching µ that satisfies W(µ) ≥ W(µ
∗) can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Consider the mixed integer linear program (OPT-Stab) from Section 2.1 for finding an optimal stable
fractional matching for I. Relaxing the integrality constraint (8) to y(m,w) ∈ [0, 1] results in a linear
program. Since a stable fractional matching always exists (see Proposition 1), this relaxation is feasible.1110
Let µ be a solution of the relaxed program. Since max{y(m,w), 1 − y(m,w)} ≥ 12 , we have that for every
man-woman pair (m,w) ∈ M ×W , either um ≥ 12U(m,w) or vw ≥
1
2V (m,w), implying that µ is
1
2 -stable.
It is also clear that W(µ) ≥ W(µ∗) since µ∗ satisfies (OPT-Stab).
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